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The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on FDA Regulation of
Prescription Drugs
RICHARD C. AUSNESS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 2009, the United States Supreme Court decided Wyeth v. Levine.'
In that case, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's failure to warn claim against
the makers of the drug Phenergan was not impliedly preempted by the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).2 In doing so, the Court rejected the argument of the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that tort claims of this nature stand
as an obstacle to federal regulatory objectives.' This article evaluates the Court's
opinion in Wyeth and examines that decision's impact on subsequent litigation in
the area of prescription drug labeling. In particular, the article considers two issues:
1) what effect will the Wyeth decision have on cases where FDA has concluded
that there is insufficient scientific evidence to justify strengthening a warning and
2) are failure to warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs preempted on
actual conflict grounds because FDA does not permit them to change unilaterally
change product labeling? A survey of FDA preemption cases decided in the past
year indicates that the Wyeth decision has had a profound effect on lower federal
courts and has led most of them to conclude that failure to warn claims against
drug manufacturers are normally not preempted.
Part 11 discusses the preemption doctrine and its application to state law tort
claims against product manufacturers. Part III examines the history of implied
preemption of tort claims against manufacturers of FDA-approved prescription
drugs prior to Wyeth. Part IV discusses the Wyeth decisions in the Vermont Su-
preme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Part V evaluates some of the
prescription drug preemption cases that have been decided in the lower federal
courts since Wyeth and concludes that these courts are now reluctant to preempt
failure to warn claims unless a manufacturer affirmatively seeks permission from
FDA to change a drug's labeling.
11. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LAW
A. The Doctrine of Federal Preemption
Although states are treated as sovereign entities within the American federal
system,' Congress can preempt state regulation in certain areas if it chooses to do
so.' According to the Supreme Court, the power to preempt state law derives from
.Mr. Ausness is Warrant, Tarrant & Combs Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky
College of Law.
I129 S.Ct. 1187(2009).
2 Id at 1204.
'Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204. FD~s position at the time the Wyeth case came before the Court
constituted a reversal of earlier statements refusing to assert that the FDCA preempted tort claims
against manufacturers of FDA-approved drugs on actual conflict grounds. Id. at 1201.
'See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 US. 452,457 (1991) (declaring that the Constitution "establishes
a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government").
ISee Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000).
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the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution .6 The principle of federal
preemption enables federal law to prevail over conflicting state statutes,' local or-
dinances' and even state common-law doctrines.' At the same time, the Supreme
Court sometimes applies a so-called "presumption against preemption" 10 in such
traditional areas of state concern as public health and safety unless Congress makes
its intent to preempt "clear and manifest.""1
Courts traditionally classify preemption as either express or implied, and further
divide the latter category into field preemption and conflict preemption.'" Express
preemption occurs when a federal statute specifically excludes state regulation in a
particular area. 'I Federal agencies, when acting within the scope of their delegated
authority, may also expressly preempt state law by regulation.'" In addition, Con-
gress may impliedly preempt state law. One form of implied preemption is field
preemption, which occurs when federal regulations are so pervasive that that they
6 See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63
(1941); see also Mary J. Davis, On Restating Products Liability Preemption, 74 Brooklyn L. Rev. 759,
761 (2009).
'See. eg, Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waster Mgt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992) (declaring that the
Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) preempts state occupational and safety standards unless
they receive federal approval); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (ruling
that the federal Natural Gas Act preempts state statute purporting to regulate issuance of long-term
securities by natural gas pipeline companies); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg.
& Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (holding state agricultural marketing statute preempted by
federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act).
ISee City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,640 (1973) (holding municipal
airport curfew preempted by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations).
ISee, eg, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (holding that Clean
Water Act bars private nuisance actions against out-of-state polluters); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall,
453 U.S. 571, 582-584 (1981) (holding Natural Gas Act preempts calculation of damages under state
contract doctrines); Chicago & N.W Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 331 (1981)
(ruling Interstate Commerce Act preempts state tort claim based on abandonment of service); Old Do-
minion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270-273 (1974) (noting
National Labor Relations Act preempts certain state-law libel claims).
11 See, eg., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-1195 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129
S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005), Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
*See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
*~ See, eg, English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-713 (1985).
"~ See, eg, Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (holding that airline
fare advertising guidelines were expressly preempted by Airline Deregulation Act); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-108 (1983) (finding that New York Human Rights Law was preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) insofar as it prohibited practices with respect
to benefit plans that were lawful under the federal act); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225, 232 (1956) (concluding that union shop agreements authorized by Railway Labor Act were valid
even if they were prohibited by state law).
"~ See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (ruling that Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) regulations preempt state prohibition against the broadcasting of
advertisements for alcoholic beverages by cable television companies); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (holding that Federal Home loan Bank Board regulation
permitting financial institutions to include "due on sale" clauses in home mortgages preempts state
prohibition against such provisions); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 667-668 (1962) (concluding that state
community property law is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with Treasury Regulations relating
to survivorship rights in U.S. savings bonds); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534,
544-545 (1958) (declaning that state law authonizing Public Utilities Commission to determine rates for
the transportation of federal property is preempted because it limits the ability of federal procurement
officers to negotiate such rates); Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 189-190 (1956) (preempting
law requiring building contractors to obtain license from state Contractors Licensing Board because it
was inconsistent with federal procurement regulations).
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leave no room for state regulations."5 A more common form of implied preemption,
known as conflict preemption, occurs either when it is impossible to comply with
both state and federal law or when state law stands as an obstacle to the achieve-
ment of federal regulatory objectives.'"
B. The Preemption of Common-Law Tort Claims.
Product manufacturers have invoked federal preemption as a defense to state
tort liability with increasing frequency in recent years.'" One of the first products
liability preemption cases was Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc 18 decided in 1992. The
Cipollone Court declared that it must construe the statute's preemptive language
"in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regula-
tions."1 9 However, the Court also determined that common-law tort doctrines could
have the same coercive effect as statutes, ordinances and administrative regula-
tions.20 The Court then concluded that the 1969 Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act expressly preempted the plaintiff's failure to warn claims against
cigarette manufacturers.2 '
A few years later, in Geier v. American Honda212 the Court held that Federal Mo-
tor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208), promulgated by the Department of
Transportation (DOT) under the authority of the National Transportation Motor
Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) '2 1 impliedly preempted design defect claims based
on a failure to equip motor vehicles with airbags. 24 A provision of NTMVSA ex-
pressly preempted "any safety standard" established by a state that was "applicable
to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment"
unless it was identical to the federal standard .25 At the same time, NTMVSA also
contained a "saving clause" which declared that compliance with federal safety
standards would not "exempt a person from liability [under] common law. "126
Acting under the authority of NTMVSA, DOT adopted a regulation, FMVSS
208, which provided for the gradual phase-in of airbags by requiring automobile
manufacturers to equip some, but not all, of their vehicles with airbags each year .
27
Honda contended that FMVSS 208 preempted the plaintiff's "no airbag" claim. The
" See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (holding that state laws regu-
lating the issuance of securities by natural gas pipeline companies was preempted by Natural Gas Act
which also regulated the issuance of such securities).
"S See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000) (concluding
that "no airbag" design defect claims were preempted by Department of Transportation vehicle safety
standards); United Stales v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000) (preempting state regulations relating to the
design, construction and operation of oil tankers); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural
Marketing & Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (holding that federal Agricultural Fair Prices
Act preempted Michigan Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act to the extent that state require-
ments conflicted with federal regulatory scheme relating to the marketing of agricultural products).
"1 See Mary J. Davis, On Restating Products Liability Preemption, 74 Brooklyn L. Rev. 759, 760-
761 (2009).
18505 U.S. 504 (1992).
19 Id. at 518.
20 See Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-emption Doctrine
Swallows the Rule, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1379, 1412 (1998).
21 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
22 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
23 NTMVSA, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) codified in various sections of 49 U.S.C. (2004)).
24 Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
25 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) (current version is located at 49 U.S.C. § 30,103(b) (2004)).
21 Id. § 1397(k) (current version is located at 49 U.S.C. § 30,103(e) (2004)).
22 Geier, 529 U.S. at 864-865.
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Court first determined that the savings clause required it to interpret the preemption
clause narrowly and, therefore, concluded that the federal safety standard would
not expressly preempt the plaintiff's design defect claim.2 8 However, the Court then
ruled that the "no airbag" claim was impliedly preempted because it conflicted with
DOT's policy of providing automobile manufacturer's with "a range of choices
among different passive restraint devices.""9
The first case to consider the possible preemptive effect of FDA regulation on state
tort claims was Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.30 The issue before the Court in that case was
whether § 521 (a) of the Medical Device Amendments,"1 now codified as 21 U.S.C. §
360k(a), expressly preempted design defect claims against a Class III medical device
manufacturer whose product had undergone what is known as a § 5 10(k) notification
process instead of FDAs more rigorous premarket approval (PMA) review.3 2 In a
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens concluded that § 360k(a) did not necessarily preempt
common-law tort claims.33 The plurality opinion noted that an FDA regulation, 21
C.F.R. § 808. 1(d), provided that § 360k(a) would preempt state and local requirements
only when FDA had established specific counterpart regulations or other regulations
that are specific to a particular device."4 In addition, only state and local requirements
that were applicable to the device would be preempted and only if they were different
from or in addition to FDAs specific requirements."
The plurality opinion also found that the § 510(k) process was more concerned
with equivalence than safety. Therefore, since FD~s requirements were not related
to the safety of the product's design, there was no overlap between them and the
standards applicable to manufacturers under state tort law.3" Thus, the Court con-
cluded that none of the plaintiffs' claims based on defective manufacturing, design
or labeling were preempted." Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, agreeing
that § 360k(a) would not preempt this particular plaintiff's design defect claims.3 "
However, he indicated that tort claims might be preempted in other cases."~
In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee"0 the Court considered whether
"fraud on the FDA' claims were preempted. The plaintiffs, who were injured by
surgical bone screws, alleged that the manufacturer and its consultant, the Buck-
man Company, had made fraudulent representations to FDA in order to obtain
agency approval to market its product as a Class III medical device . 41 According to
11 Id. at 868.
29 Id. at 875.
30 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
3' 90 Stat. 539 (1976), now codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-360 (2000).
32 In the case of original medical devices, § 360e declares that the manufacturer must provide
reasonable assurance to FDA that the I device is both "safe and effective." 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (2000).
For example, under the PMA process, the applicant must provide a full report of any clinical investiga-
tions that concern the safety or effectiveness of the proposed device. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(a) (2000).
However, a different standard applies to medical devices that are "substantially equivalent" to devices
that were marketed prior to the enactment of the MDA. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(l)(A)(ii) (2000). In such
cases, the manufacturer of the proposed device can bypass the PMA requirements and obtain an FDA
finding of substantial equivalence by submitting a premarket notification to the agency. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360(k), 360c(f)(4) (2000). This is known as §510(k) notification after the number of the section in the
original Act. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478.
33 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 503.
- 21 C.F.R. § 808.1l(d) (1995) (emphasis added).
31 Id. (emphasis added).
36 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 492-494.
11 Id. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 503-05.
- 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
4' Id. at 343.
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the plaintiffs, the manufacturer obtained FDA approval by claiming that the bone
screws would be used in the long bones of the arms and legs when, in reality, the
company intended to market them principally for use in spinal fusion surgery."2
The Buckman Court held that the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-agency claims were im-
pliedly preempted by the Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA.4 3 In contrast to
its approach in Geier, the Court acknowledged the existence of a presumption against
preemption." However, it concluded that issue involved in Buckman was inherently
federal in character and that the states had no interest in protecting FDA against
fraudulent representations by license applicants.45 Consequently, the Court concluded
that the presumption against preemption was not applicable in this case .
4
1
Although the plaintiffs argued that the Court should not consider implied pre-
emption when the statute in question contained an express preemption provision,
the Court affirmed the position adopted in Geier that neither an express preemption
provision nor a savings clause would prevent the "ordinary working of conflict pre-
emption principles."147 The Court then determined that a conflict did exist between
common-law tort claims like the plaintiffs'and FD~s need to balance a number of
regulatory objectives.48 While one of these objectives was to protect the integrity of
the licensing process, another was to ensure that the licensing process did not slow
down the introduction of new medical products into the market or interfere with
the judgment of healthcare professionals.49 In the Court's view, allowing private
persons to bring fraud-on-the-agency claims against manufacturers of medical de-
vices would greatly increase the cost of licensing for both applicants and FDA."0
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,"' the plaintiff argued that a boat engine manu-
factured by the defendant was defective because it did not have a shroud or guard
around its propeller. The Federal Boat Safety Act5 2 authorized the Secretary of
Transportation to establish safety standards for recreational boats and equipment."
The Act expressly prohibited the states from establishing safety standards that were
not identical to the federal standards,514 but also contained a saving clause.5 " In its
analysis of the preemption issue, the Court pointed out that a Coast Guard advi-
sory committee had studied the question of propeller guards, but had declined to
recommend that they be required.5 " Because of the existence of the savings clause,
the Court interpreted the Act's preemption provision narrowly and concluded that
it did not expressly preempt state common law.57 The Court also rejected the argu-
ment that the Act impliedly preempted the plaintiff's tort claims."8
42 Id. at 346.
43 Id.
14 Id. at 347-348.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 348.
41 Id. at 352 (quoting Geier v. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
48 Id. at 348.
11 Id. at 349.
50 Id. at 350-351.
51 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
52 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2007).
53 Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-75, § 2, 85 Stat. 213-214 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C §§ 4301-4311 (2007)).
S46 U.S. C. § 4306 (2007).
SId., § 4311l(g). A "saving" or "savings" clause is an exception to the general operation of a
statute. See Stafford v. Wessel, 52 N.E.2d 605, 605-606 (Ct. App. 111. 1943).
56 Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 60-61.
17 Id. at 64.
51 Id. at 69-70.
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In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,5 9 the Court again refused to preempt a tort
claim. Bates involved a suit by a group of Texas peanut farmers against the manu-
facturer of a weed killer that was registered by the EPA under the provisions of
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).10 The product's
original label claimed that it could be used "in all areas where peanuts are grown.""'
In tact, the product was unsuitable for use in soil which had a pH of 7.2 or more
and it damaged the plaintiffs' peanut crops.62 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer
alleging negligence, strict products liability, fraud, breach of express warranty and
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act .63 The
manufacturer attempted to defend against these claims by contending that they
were expressly and impliedly preempted by FIFRA.1
FIFRA contained an express preemption clause, § 136v(b), which prohibited
states from imposing "any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to
or different from" those required by FIFRA.6 5 However, the Court held that the
term "requirements" as used in § 136v(b) did not preempt the plaintiffs' common-
law tort claims.66 The Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that tort liability
was a "requirement" because it could induce the manufacturer to alter its label,'
6
1
finding instead, that § 1 36v(b) permitted the state to impose "parallel requirements"
and different or additional remedies than FIFRA .6 ' The Court also invoked the
presumption against preemption to justify its narrow reading of § 1 36v(b)6 ' and
rejected the defendant's contention that FIFRA intended to impose a high degree
of centralization and uniformity on pesticide labeling."0
Finally, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court concluded that the plaintiff's
design defect claim against the manufacturer of the Evergreen Balloon Catheter,
a Class III medical device used for opening clogged arteries during angioplasty
operations, was expressly preempted.' The defendant's catheter had been approved
for marketing by FDA in 1994 pursuant to its PMA process."7 The plaintiff alleged
that the manufacturer was negligent with respect to the design, testing, inspection,
manufacture, distribution, labeling, marketing and sale of its Evergreen Balloon
Catheters. 3 The complaint also sought damages based on strict liability, breach of
express warranty and breach of implied warranty7 4 In response, Medtronic alleged
that the plaintiff's claims were preempted by § 360k(a) of the FDCA.7 5 The lower
court later dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims.76 On appeal, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the Evergreen Balloon Catheter was subject to
the federal device-specific requirement of complying with the particular standards
set forth in Medtronic's approved PMA application.7 7
59 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
10 Id. at 434.
61 Id. at 435.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006).
66 Bates, 544 U.S. at 452.
67 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 332 FM3 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2003).
6' Bates, 544 U.S. at 447-448.
69 Id. at 449.
70 Id. at 450-45 1.
" See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 106-107 (2d Cir. 2006).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 107-108.
77 Id.
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On appeal, the Court considered whether the federal government had "estab-
lished requirements applicable to Medtronic's catheter" and, if so, whether the
plaintiffs' tort claims were based upon state law requirements with respect to that
device that were "'.different from, or in addition to' the federal ones, and that related
to safety and effectiveness."" 8 First, the Court determined that the requirements
contained in FD~s premarket approval of the Medtronic catheter were federal
requirements specific to that device."9 Next, the Court considered whether any of
the plaintiffs' claims relied upon "any requirement" that was "different from, or
in addition to" federal requirements applicable to the Medtronic catheter .80 The
Court first determined that negligence and strict liability doctrines could impose
state "requirements" that were subject to preemption by federal requirements that
were specific to a particular medical device."' The Court then responded to the
plaintiffs' contention that state law negligence or strict liability doctrines should
not be preempted because they were not specific to the defendant's catheter or even
to medical devices in general .8 1 Citing its opinion in Lohr, the Court pointed out
that nothing in § 360k(a) suggested that it would preempt only state requirements
that applied specifically to medical devices.83 Furthermore, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs' contention that § 360k(a) did not apply to "state or local requirements of
general applicability."8" The Court concluded by reaffirming that § 360k(a) did not
preempt all tort claims against medical device manufacturers, but only those that
were "different from, or in addition to" requirements imposed by federal law .85 Thus,
§ 360k(a) would not preempt parallel claims, including claims based on violation
of state law requirements that paralleled federal requirements.
86
H1I. PREEMPTION LITIGATION PRIOR TO WYETH
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth, there was a split of authority
among the lower courts as to whether the FDCA impliedly preempted failure to
warn claims against pharmaceutical companies.8" In re Zyprexa Products Liability
Litigation18 is illustrative of the majority position finding no preemption, while
SId. at 1006.
SId. at 1006-1007.
80 Id.
SIId. at 1007-1008.
82Id. at 1009- 10 10.
83Id. at 1010.
8.4 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
17 The following cases failed to find preemption: In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d
230 (E.D.N.Y 2007) (Zyprexa); Perry v. Novaritis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(Elidel); Adesina v. Aladan Corp., 438 F. Supp.2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 2d 964 (D. Neb. 2006) (Zoloft); Laisure-Radke v. Par Pharm., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (WD.
Wash. 2006) (Prozac); Peters v. Astrazenica, L.PS.E.2d 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (WD. Wis. 2006) (Pnilosec);
Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Minn. 2005) (Zoloft); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp.,
172 F Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. 111. 2001) (Parlodel); Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (C.D. Cal.
2000), rev'd on other grounds, 358 EMd 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Zoloft); Bryant v. Hoffmann-LaRoche,
Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (heart medication); Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003) (pain medication); Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006) (Phenergan); Kurer v. Park,
Davis & Co., 679 N.W2d 867 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (oral contraceptive). The following cases did find
preemption: Home v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 2d 768 (WD.N.C. 2008); Sykes v.
Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (HypRho-D immune globulin); Colacicco v.
Apotex, Inc., 432 F Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd, 521 EM3 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated 129 US.
1578 (2009); Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 F Supp. 2d 1189 (D.N.J. 2002) (Adderall).
88 489 F Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y 2007).
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Horne v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation"9 exemplifies the reasoning of those
courts that concluded that such claims were preempted.
A. In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation
In 2004, the plaintiff, who was treated with the antipsychotic drug, Zeprexa,
brought a products liability action against the drug's manufacturer, Eli Lilly in a
New York federal district court.9 0 Later, that year, thousands of similar cases were
transferred to that court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation."1 Some
8000 of these claims were eventually settled in November, 2005 and a large number
of newly transferred cases were settled in January, 2007.92 However, approximately
1000 of these cases were not disposed of and were scheduled for trial later that
year.9 3 Prior to trial, Eli Lilly moved for summnary judgment in four of these cases,
arguing that federal law preempted the plaintiffs' failure to warn claims against it.
9 4
In a lengthy opinion, Judge Jack Weinstein denied the defendant's motion."
Zyprexa was approved by the FDA in 1996 for treating schizophrenia and acute
manic episodes associated with bipolar disorder." In May, 2000, FDA investigated
whether patients who took atypical antipsychotic drugs, such as Zyprexa, might
be subject to an increased risk of diabetes and hyperglycemia. 7 As a result of this
inquiry, in September, 2003, FDA directed the manufacturers of such drugs to
warn about the possible connection between antipsychotic drugs and these condi-
tions.9" Shortly thereafter, Eli Lilly added the required warning to Zyprexa's prod-
uct labeling. 9 Two of the plaintiffs were diagnosed as diabetic after being treated
with Zyprexa, another plaintiff claimed that Zyprexa caused his existing diabetic
condition to worsen, and a fourth plaintiff contended that Zyprexa was responsible
for her hyperglycemia.10' Each of these plaintiffs argued that the FDA-approved
warnings on Zyprexa did not adequately inform their physicians about the risks of
diabetes and hyperglycemia. The defendant, on the other hand, maintained that the
plaintiffs should not be allowed to claim that warnings approved by FDA pursuant
to its premarket approval process were inadequate.
The court's opinion focused on two issues: the presumption against preemption
and FDA's claim of preemption in the Preamble of its final rule on product label-
ing. Finding that there was ambiguity about the preemptive effect of FDA label-
ing requirements in failure to warn cases, the court declared that "a federal court
should take the law's default position, honoring the traditional state control of tort
law."101 To overcome this presumption against preemption. the court declared that
the party asserting preemption as a defense must show: 1) express preemption by
Congress or, when statutorily authorized, by the regulatory agency; 2) that Congress
intended to occupy the field; or 3) that state law would conflict with federal objec-
1 541 F Supp. 2d 768 (WD.N.C. 2008).
1 In re Zeprexa, 489 E Supp. 2d at 236.
1' Id. at 236-23 7.
92 Id. at 237-238.
11 Id. at 238.
91 Id. at 271.
95 Id. at291.
96 Id. at 248.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 249.
100 Id. at 253-262.
0I Id. at 240.
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tives to such a great extent that coexistence was not possible."' 2 The second issue
before the court was whether it should defer to FDA's position, notwithstanding
the presumption against preemption. FDA's position on preemption appeared in
the Preamble to a final rule on prescription drug labeling that it promulgated in
January, 2006. 103 In this Preamble, FDA warned that state tort actions threatened
its role as the federal agency responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs.104
Consequently, FDA declared that failure to warn claims should be preempted on
conflict grounds when the warning in question was approved by the agency as part
of its premarket approval process.105
The court found that the greatest deference should be given when Congress had
expressly delegated authority to the agency to make rules having the force of law and
that the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that author-
ity.'016 According to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, in such cases a court
should accept the agency's interpretation of its statute as long as the interpretation
was reasonable.107 In addition, according to the Court's holding in Auer v. Robbins,'
a court should treat an agency's statement clarifying ambiguities in its own regulations
as controlling unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." 09
Finally, the Court's holding in Skidmore, provided that agency interpretations that
did not qualify for deference under the Chevron or Auer standard would be accepted
by courts only if they have the "power to persuade.""10 After describing these various
forms of deference, the court determined that the Preamble to the FDA's Final Rule
was not entitled to deference under either Chevron or Auer and, therefore, would
be binding only if it had the "power to persuade" as required under Skidmore.'
After setting forth these principles of agency deference, the court concluded that the
defendant's preemption by preamble claim was not persuasive. "I First of all, the court
pointed out that the Preamble was inconsistent with FD~s prior interpretations of the
FDCA."II3 The court also observed that most other courts had rejected the contention
that FDA's labeling approval process preempted failure to warn claims.' ' Finally, the
court noted that the Preamble was nothing more than an advisory opinion, which
purported to bind only the agency and which could be changed at any time without
notice or opportunity for public comment."' Therefore, the court found that FDAs
guidelines were only entitled to "some deference."'"
6
102 Id. at 272-273.
03 See FDA, Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Presecription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006), see also Cristina Rodriguez, The FDA
Preamble: A Backdoor to Federalization of Prescription Warning Labels?, 41 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV.
161 (2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of
Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007); Katherine M. Glaser, Comment, A Step Toward Preemption:
The Effect of the FDAs 2006 Preamble, 80 TEMPLE L. REV. 871 (2007)..
"I Id. at 3935.
O0S Id. at 3935-3936.
0In re Zeprexa, 489 E Supp. 2d at 272.
0See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This is known
as "Chevron Deference. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, "After You, My Dear Alphonse!": Should the
Courts Defer to the FDA's New Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80
TUL. L. REV.727, 759 (2006).
0519 U.S. 452 (1997).
'~Id. at 46 1.
110 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
"In re Zeprexa. 489 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
112 Id.
113 Id.
HI Id. at 274.
115 Id.
'16 See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995).
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The court concluded by holding that the presumption against preemption had
not been overcome. According to the court, there was no clear statement of con-
gressional intent to preempt."' Furthermore, the Preamble did not amount to a
regulation expressly identifying a congressional intent to preempt."' In addition,
the court concluded that there was no actual conflict between the plaintiffs' failure
to warn claims and federal law."19 The court noted that a jury verdict holding Eli
Lilly liable for failing to warn of Zyprexa's risks would not actually compel it to
change its labeling.120 The court also suggested that FDA's Preamble may not even
apply to the plaintiffs' claims in this case, but may only apply to warnings that had
been expressly rejected by FDA.'"' Finally, the court endorsed the argument that
tort law can complement FDAs mandate to promote drug safety by providing an
additional incentive to manufacturers to ensure that their products are safe before
they are marketed to consumers.1
2
B. Horne v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation
Horne v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.'12 1 is illustrative of the pre- Wyeth cases
holding that failure to warn cases against prescription drug manufacturers could
be impliedly preempted. The plaintiff in that case brought suit against the manu-
facturer of Lotensin HCT, an angiotensin-converting-enzyme (ACE) inhibitor,
which was prescribed to treat hypertension.12 4 The plaintiff took Lotensin while
pregnant until her doctor switched her prescription to another form of hypertension
medicine.125 According to the plaintiff, Lotensin caused her son to be born with
heart and kidney defects which resulted in death 19 days later.12 1 She contended that
Lotensin's labeling should have warned that fetal injuries might occur to women
took the product in the first trimester of their pregnancy 27 IThe FDA-approved
labeling warned of the danger of fetal injury from ACE inhibitors like Lotensin if
taken in the second or third trimester, but asserted that no link between Lotensin
and fetal injuries had been established when the drug was used during the first
trimester of pregnancy. 21The dfnant brought suit against Novartis, the drug's
manufacturer, alleging negligence, wantonness, failure to warn, breach of warranty
and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment.'
In response, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff's claims
"directly conflicted with the pregnancy category classifications and warnings ap-
proved and mandated by the FDA for products containing ACE inhibitors, such
as Lotensin HCT."3 0 The court agreed with this contention and ruled that the
117 Id.
118 Id.
"~Id. at 276.
2Id. at 276-277.
21Id. at 277.
122 Id. at 277-778 (quoting Jonathan V O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the
Argument Against Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs,
48 Ariz. L. Rev. 67, 94 (2006)).
123 541 F. Supp. 2d 768 (WD.N.C. 2008).
"24 Id. at 772.
125 Id.
126 Id.
"2I Id. at 772-773.
128 Id. at 773-775.
29 Id. at 775.
130 Id.
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plaintiff's failure to warn claims were preempted.'"' One issue before the court
was how much deference should be given to FDA's Preamble on Preemption.
3
1
2
The court observed that a number of courts had ruled that it was appropriate to
give considerable deference to the Preamble.3 3 However, the plaintiff argued that
the court should look to the intent of Congress, not FDA, to determine whether
conflict preemption was applicable.' The plaintiff pointed out that Congress had
expressed an intent that state law not be preempted by the FDCA. For example,
when Congress amended the Act in 1962, it declared that the FDCA should not
be construed to preempt state law "unless there is a direct and positive conflict"
between the two.' Furthermore, when Congress amended the FDCA again in
1997, it did not place any statement in the law regarding its preemptive effect.'
According to the plaintiff, in light of its silence on the issue of preemption, the
court should presume that Congress did not intend to preempt state law tort claims
against drug manufacturers.17
The court conceded that the issue of preemption normally would require
it to examine the intent of Congress and in the absence of express preemp-
tion language, a court would ordinarily presume that Congress did not intend
to supplant state law.' However, the court observed that state law might be
preempted on actual conflict grounds even when Congress did not specifically
intend to preempt it.'3 9 Therefore, in conflict preemption cases, a court should
look beyond the stated intent of Congress and FDA to determine whether the
plaintiff's failure to warn claims would actually conflict with the FDCA or FD~s
drug labeling regulations.'
The court in Horne observed that Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline also involved drug
labeling that had been expressly considered and approved by FDA and the court
in that case concluded that the warning that the plaintiff proposed would directly
conflict with the FDA-approved warnings.'14 ' According to the court in Horne, the
situation was very similar to the situation in Sykes.14 1 In Sykes, the plaintiff argued
that the defendant failed to provide an adequate warning about mercury levels in
thimerosal, a preservative used in an immune gobulin that was administered to the
plaintiff while she was pregnant.4 3' The FDA-approved package insert disclosed the
presence of mercury in the product and declared that it was not known whether it
could cause fetal harm when administered to pregnant women.'1" The court con-
cluded that any affirmative statement made by the manufacturer that thimerosal
was toxic to fetuses would directly contradict FDA's finding that such toxicity had
not been established.145 Furthermore, the change in the labeling advocated by the
''Id. at 783.
12Id. at 780.
'>Id. at 780 (citing Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Dobbs v.
Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1287-1289 (WD. Okla. 2008)).
134 Id. at 781.
' Id. (citing Drug Amendments of 1962 § 202, 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)).
136 Id.
137 Id.
"'8 Id. (quoting New York State Conf. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654 (1995).
139 Id.
140 Id,
'4' 484 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
14 Home, 541 FE Supp. 2d at 782.
41Sykes, 484 FE Supp. 2d at 292.
144 Id. at 311.
14 Id.
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plaintiff would violate FDA requirements that such statements be substantiated by
"reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug."'14 6
According to the court in Horne, the plaintiff in that case was making a similar
claim to the one that was made in Sykes.' 7 In her complaint, the plaintiff con-
tended that the defendant should have changed the drug's labeling to declare that
there were "dangerous" and "significant" risks of birth defects and fetal injury if
pregnant women used Lotensin HCT during the first trimester of pregnancy.
4 14
1
However, the FDA-approved labeling stated that FDA had affirmatively considered
the medical and scientific proof available at the time the drug was approved for
sale and had concluded that the risks of birth were apparently not associated with
use of the drug during the first trimester of pregnancy. 141
Furthermore, the plaintiff had failed to identify any studies in existence at the
time of her pregnancy that indicated that birth defects might be caused by the use
of Lotensin HCT or any other ACE inhibitor during the first trimester.' Nor did
the plaintiff allege that the defendant has any "reasonable evidence" at the time of
her pregnancy that would require a revision of the labeling in accordance with 21
C.F.R. § 201.57 (c)(6).'5' The only evidence the plaintiff presented this issue was the
Cooper Study, published after the birth of her child, which suggested a possible link
between exposure to ACE inhibitors during the first trimester and the occurrence of
birth defects.15 1 Moreover, the court observed, FDA in a 2006 Public Health Advi-
sory declared that the Cooper Study's evidence was the first to suggest that women
who took ACE inhibitors during the first trimester of pregnancy might suffer birth
defects."' FDA also pointed out that the results of "this one observational study"
were not sufficient to justify any change to the pregnancy categories or any additional
warning for ACE inhibitors. 15 Therefore, the court determined tha:'
Given the lack of scientific evidence of an association of birth defects and
the use of ACE inhibitors during the first trimester, during the relevant
period, if Defendant had added the additional warnings advocated by the
Plaintiff, the label content would not have been substantiated by "reason-
able evidence of a causal association" between the serious hazard claimed
and the drug.
For this reason, the defendant could not have utilized the CBE supplement pro-
cess to unilaterally add additional warnings to Lotensin HCT's labeling, nor would
it have been successful in asking FDA to do so by filing a supplemental NDA.
1Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201 .57(c)(6) (2009)). Generally, before a dr ug manufacturer can make a
change in the approved labeling, it must submit a supplemental New Drug Application to FDA describ-
ing the proposed change and obtain FDA approval. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (2009). However, under the
"changes being effected" or CBE process, a manufacturer may "add or strengthen a containdication,
warning, precaution or adverse reaction" without obtaining prior FDA approval by filing a supplemental
application with the agency 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (c)(2)(i) (2009). See also Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceuti-
cal Co., 659 E Supp. 2d 279, 287-289 (D.N. H. 2009).
"I Home, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
148 Id.
149 Id.
1'0 Id. at 782-783.
~ Id. 783.
152 Id.
' Id. (citing FDA Public Health Advisory, Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitor (ACE
Inhibitor) Drugs and Pregnancy, Doe. 11-3 (2006)).
54 Id. (citing FDA Public Health Advisory, Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme Inhibitor (ACE
Inhibitor) Drugs and Pregnancy, Doe. 11 -3 (2006)).
15 Id.
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This led the court in Horne to conclude that: 1 6
To hold the Defendant liable for failing to provide an additional warning
to the effect that use of Lotensin HCT during the first trimester poses risks
of birth defect and fetal injury when the FDA has already determined that
such risks do not appear to result from use of the drug in the first trimester
would create a direct conflict between the requirements of federal law and
the requirements of state law and would place the Defendant in an impos-
sible situation whereby the Defendant could not comply with federal law
and state law at the same time.
Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff's failure to warn claims were
preempted.'
IV. THE WYETH DECISION
A. Levine v. Wyeth
The plaintiff in Wyeth received two injections of the defendant's drug, Phenergan,
an antihistamine, in order to treat nausea resulting from a migraine headache.'
The first dose was administered by intramuscular injection and when that failed to
stop the plaintiff's nausea, a second dose was administered by intravenous injection
into her arm.' Using a procedure known as IV push, the drug was mistakenly
injected into the patient's artery instead of her vein, resulting in damage to her
artery and eventual amputation of her arm.'61 The plaintiff brought suit against
Wyeth, the manufacturer of Phenergan, in a Vermont state court, relying on both
negligence and strict products liability theories.'6 ' The plaintiff alleged that that
the drug's FDA-approved labeling was inadequate because it did not instruct
health care professionals to use the IV-drip method of intravenous administration
instead of the more risky IV-push method.' In addition, the plaintiff claimed
that Phenergan was not reasonably safe for intravenous administration because
the risks of gangrene were greater than the therapeutic benefits of this method of
administering the drug.16 1
The trial court rejected the defendant's preemption claim and the jury awarded
almost $7 million in damages.'11 In its appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, Wyeth
continued to argue that the FDCA impliedly preempted the plaintiff's failure to warn
claim.165 The drug manufacturer contended that because FDA had ordered it to use
516 Id. at 782.
117 Id. at 783. However, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence and breach of war-
ranty claims insofar as they were based on defective design or manufacture or inadequate research,
development or testing. Id. at 785-7 87.
"I' Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006).
159 Id. at 182.
161 Levine, 944 A.2d at 182.
6 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191.
612 Levine, 944 A.2d at 1191-1192. There are two ways to administer the injectable form of Phen-
ergan intravenously. The first is the IV-push method, in which the drug is injected directly into the
patient's vein; the second is the IV-drip method, whereby the drug is inserted into the patient's vein in
a saline solution which slowly descends from a hanging intravenous bag. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1191.
6I Id. at 1192.
164 Levine, 944 A.2d at 182-183.
"3 Id. at 183-184.
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the warning language in question on its labeling, notwithstanding the agency's aware-
ness of the risks of administration by the IV-push procedure, it would be impossible
for Wyeth to comply with the requirements of both state and federal law. 16 6 In addi-
tion, Wyeth claimed that state tort doctrines undermined FDAs labeling scheme by
allowing consumers to recover damages against drug companies even though they
used FDA-approved labeling on their products. 
16
1
The defendant's impossibility argument was reminiscent of McDermott v. Wiscon-
sin,'16 1 where a purveyor of syrup successfully claimed that he could not comply with
both federal labeling requirements and those of the state of Wisconsin because they
were inconsistent.169 The defendant in Wyeth argued that its situation was similar
because FDA had prohibited it from providing a stronger warning about IV-push
administration of Phenergan.17 0 The Vermont court, however, responded that FDA
had not expressly prohibited Wyeth from changing Phenergan's labeling and that the
company was free to do so without prior FDA approval under § 314.70(c). In addition,
the defendant contended that FDA had expressed its opinion about the adequacy of
the drug's labeling when it reviewed the label for use in a different version of Phenergan
and directed the manufacturer to "[r]etain verbiage in current label."'17' However, the
Vermont court did not agree that this directive indicated that FDA would necessarily
refuse to permit Wyeth to provide a stronger warning. 7 I Since Wyeth could strengthen
its warning pursuant to § 314.70(c), the court concluded that it was not impossible
for the drug manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law.'
The defendant also argued that liability under state tort law for use of FDA-ap-
proved labeling stood as an obstacle to federal regulatory objectives. 714 However, the
court determined that FDA labeling requirements created a floor, not a ceiling for
state regulation.175 According to the court, this conclusion was consistent with the
FDCA's principal goal of protecting consumers from dangerous products.' The
court also declared that its position was supported by 1962 amendments to the FDCA
that expressly limited the preemptive effect of the statute.' In the court's view, this
provision indicated that Congress wished to leave state law, including common law
tort principles, in place unless they created a "direct and positive conflict" between
state and federal law.'17 8
Finally, the Vermont court considered FD~s Preamble on Preemption. While
acknowledging that it would ordinarily defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute
that it administers,17 1 the court concluded that FDA's interpretation was not entitled
to any deference because it was inconsistent with the 1962 Amendments.' As the
court pointed out, FDAs statement was neither an authoritative interpretation of
166 Id. at 185.
167 Id.
68 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
69 Id. at 137.
170 Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 188.
171 Id.
72 Id. at 189.
173 Id.
'74 Id. at 190.
17 Id.
176 Id.
77 Id. (citing Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-78 1, § 202, 76
Stat. 780, 793 (1962)).
17 Id. at 190-191.
'71 Id. at 192 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)).
110 Id. at 192-193.
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an ambiguous statutory provision, nor was it a persuasive policy statement.'8 Since
Congress had expressed an unambiguous intent to preserve state laws that did not
create a "direct and positive" conflict with federal law, the court concluded that FD~s
views on preemption could not trump those of Congress.
1 2
B. Wyeth v. Levine
On March 4, 2009, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Vermont
court's decision in Wyeth."I Justice Stevens, joined by four other Justices,' wrote
the majority opinion.' Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but filed a
separate concurring opinion,' while Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Scalia, dissented.' The Court addressed both of Wyeth's preemption
arguments: 1) that it would have been impossible for the company to modify exist-
ing FDA-approved labeling without violating federal law; and 2) that the plaintiff's
state law failure to warn claims would constitute an obstacle to federal regulatory
policy because it would allow lay jurors to substitute their judgment for that of
FDA as to the adequacy of FDA-approved drug labeling.'
As a preliminary matter, the Court made it clear that the jury in Wyeth had not
concluded that the IV-push procedure should be contraindicated or that Wyeth should
have placed any particular warning language on its labeling; rather, according to the
Court, the jury had simply determined that the language that Wyeth did place on
its Phenergan labeling did not adequately warn about the risks of injection by the
IV-push method.' The issue in Wyeth, therefore, was whether federal law impliedly
preempted the claim that Wyeth failed to provide an adequate warning about the
risks of using the IV-push procedure. 980 To answer that question, the Court declared,
it must be guided by "two cornerstones of our pre-emption jurisprudence:" First,
that "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case"
and, second, "that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.""
In response to the defendant's "impossibility" argument, the Court pointed
out that FDAs "changes being effected" (CBE) regulation' permitted a drug
manufacturer to strengthen an existing warning or add an additional warning or
contraindication to FDA-approved labeling without seeking prior approval from
FDA.' Wyeth contended that this CBE regulation was not applicable because it
only allowed a manufacturer to change its label "to reflect newly acquired informa-
tion."' For this reason, Wyeth maintained, it could not have changed Phenergan's
labeling pursuant to the CBE regulation unless new information subsequently
became available that had not already been considered by FDA. 95 However, the
"I Id. at 194.
82 Id.
'~Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy and Souter.
185 Id. at 1190.
8Id. at 1204-1217. Justice Breyer also wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 1204.
8Id. at 1217-1231.
8Id. at 1193-1194.
819 Id. at 1194.
19 Id.
"I' Id. at 1194-1195.
92 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2009).
93 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
94 Id. at 1197.
95 Id.
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Court observed that FDA had expressly stated that "newly acquired information"
included not only new data, but also encompassed "new analyses of previously
submitted data."'91 6 Thus, the requirements of the CBE regulation could be satis-
fied if new analyses of existing data showed that the existence of greater risks
or different risks than had previously been disclosed to FDA. 117 While there was
little evidence of new information about the risks of IV-push administration of
Phenergan, the Court suggested that Wyeth could have reevaluated post-approval
reporting of amputations from this procedure and formulated a stronger warning
on the basis of this new data.'
Wyeth also claimed that it would be liable for unauthorized distribution and
misbranding if it marketed Phenergan without first obtaining FDA approval for
any revised labeling.' According to Wyeth, if the manufacturer made an unau-
thorized labeling change to Phenergan, FDA would treat it as an unapproved new
drug."' 0 Any marketing without FDA approval would constitute an unauthorized
distribution of the drug. Furthermore, altering the approved labeling would cause
FDA to classify Phenergan as misbranded.2 0' However, the Court rejected both
of these contentions. First, it concluded that changing the labeling would not
cause Phenergan to be considered a new drug under the statutory definition of
that term. 02 In addition, the Court expressed skepticism that FDA would bring
an enforcement action against the manufacturer for misbranding simply because
it had strengthened Phenergan's warning. 0 '
Moreover, the Court also took issue with Wyeth's implicit assumption that FDA,
rather than the manufacturer, was primarily responsible for the drug labeling."a In
the Court's view, "it has remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that
the manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times. "
2 0 5
Indeed, prior to 2007, FDA lacked legal authority to require a drug manufacturer
to modify its label .2 0 1 When Congress did grant this power to FDA, it reaffirmed
the manufacturer's responsibilities with respect to drug warnings and referred spe-
cifically to the CBE regulation. 207 Finally, the Court distinguished between a situa-
tion in which FDA had affirmatively prohibited a drug company from changing a
product's labeling and a present situation where FDA had not taken a position on
the issue of stronger warnings. Since Wyeth had presented no evidence that FDA
had concluded that stronger warning was not needed 2 0 the Court concluded that
Wyeth had failed to prove "that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal
and state requirements. " 09
Wyeth's second preemption argument reasoned that an obligation, imposed
under state tort law, to provide a stronger warning about the risks of the IV-push
96 Id., citing Rules and Regulations, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), FDA,
21 CFR Parts 314, 601 and 814, Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs, biologics and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,604 (Aug. 22, 2008)).
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200) Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.( citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2000) and 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h) (2009)).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1197-1198.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1198.
207 Id.
21 Id. at 1198-1 199.
2D Id. at 1199.
262 OL. 65
2010 ~THE IMPACT? OF WYETH V. LEVINE26
procedure would "obstruct the purposes and objectives of federal drug labeling
regulations.""' 0 According to Wyeth, Congress intended that FDA make "drug label-
ing decisions that strike a balance between competing objectives. 2 ... In effect, the
FDCA established "both a floor and a ceiling for drug regulation" which precluded
juries in tort cases from finding FDA-approved labeling to be inadequate. 12 The
Court, however, declared that this argument relied on "an untenable interpretation
of congressional intent and an overbroad view of an agency's power to preempt
state law."21 ' In the Court's view, the failure of Congress to provide a federal remedy
in the 1938 FDCA or any of its subsequent amendments indicated that it expected
state tort law to provide adequate relief for consumers who were injured by unsafe
drugs."' Furthermore, the Court reasoned, if Congress believed that tort litigation
threatened federal regulatory objectives, it would have added an express preemption
provision to the FDCA at some point in its history"'
The Court also distinguished its decision in Geier, which held that DOT's pas-
sive restraint regulation impliedly preempted "no airbag" lawsuits by accident
victims."' Wyeth had claimed that FDXs regulatory scheme was similar to that in
Geier."'7 However, the Court disagreed. Not only had DOT conducted a formal
rulemaking before adopting a regulation that allowed automobile companies to
phase in airbags,210 but there was also ample evidence that DOT had considered a
variety of factors in the formulation of its regulatory scheme. 1 ' Finally, the Court
in Geier took into account DOT's explanation of how no-airbag lawsuits would
interfere with its decision to phase in airbags rather than requiring automakers
to provide them in all of their cars immediately. 220 In contrast, FDA approval of
Phenergan's labeling was not the product of a formal rulemaking procedure, nor
was there any evidence that it represented some sort of explicit policy choice on
the part of the agency.22' Indeed, the FDCAs regulatory history revealed a "long-
standing coexistence of state and federal law and FDA's traditional recognition of
state-law remedies-a recognition in place each time the agency reviewed Wyeth's
Phenergan label."1222 Thus, the Court concluded that it was not impossible for Wyeth
to comply with both state and federal obligations, nor did the plaintiff's failure to
warn claims stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional purposes
as reflected in the FDCA 223
Both Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas wrote concurring opinions. Although
he agreed that FDXs approval of the Phenergan labeling did not impliedly pre-
empt Levine's failure to warn claim, Justice Breyer acknowledged that such claims
might be preempted in other circumstances. 224 For example, state tort law might be
preempted on actual conflict grounds if it interfered with "FDA's desire to create
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
114 Id. at 1199-1200.
25Id. at 1200.
26Id. at 1203.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1204.
224 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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a drug label containing a specific set of cautions or instructions12 2 1 or if it forced
drug manufacturers to "raise prices to a point where those who are sick are un-
able to obtain the drugs they need."12 2 1 Justice Thomas concurred in the Court's
judgment, but disagreed with "the majority's implicit endorsement of far-reaching
pre-emption doctrines.12 2 1 Specifically, Justice Thomas decried the "purposes and
objectives" aspect of the preemption doctrine, which he believed, enabled the Court
to invalidate state laws "based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy ob-
jectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that
are not embodied within the text of federal law."1
22
1
Justice Alito wrote the dissenting opinion. To the dissenters, the issue was not
whether the defendant had a duty to provide an adequate warning about the risks
of injecting Phenergan using the IV-push procedure; rather, it was whether FDA or
a lay jury should decide whether the warning in question was adequate .229 According
to the dissent, this decision should be made by FDA alone and not second guessed
by juries in products liability lawsuits. 3 0 The dissent's argument for preemption was
based on the conclusion that FDCA vested FDA with primary responsibility for
drug safety.23 ' There was nothing in the FDCAs comprehensive regulatory scheme
that suggested that Congress had intended for lay juries to exercise some sort of
oversight role over FDA and its drug approval process. 3 2
The dissent made a number of assertions to support his argument that the
plaintiff's failure to warn claim constituted an obstacle to FDA's ability to regulate
the labeling of Phenergan and other drugs. First, it declared that, contrary to the
majority's claim, FDA "specifically considered and reconsidered the strength of
Phenergan's IV-push related warnings in light of new scientific and medical data.1
2 3
The dissent pointed out that in 1987, FDA directed Wyeth to strengthen its warn-
ing about the risks of IV-push injections and cited published reports of gangrene
caused by this method of administration . 3 4 In support of its label change order,
FDA also cited numerous articles which discussed the enhanced risks of injecting
Phenergan and similar drugs in the crook of the elbow, a common injection site.23 '
Thus, FDA was well aware of the risks of IV-push injection in a patient's elbow
and while it required Wyeth to provide warnings about this risk, it also refused to
prohibit physicians from using this method of administration .
2
1
Second, the dissent argued that the Court's reasoning in Geier compelled a find-
ing that the plaintiff's failure to warn claim should be preempted. 37 As in Geier,
when FDA approved the Phenergan label, it authorized a number of "safe" and
"effective" methods of administration, including the IV-push procedure. 3 ' Even
though tort actions did not absolutely prohibit the use of the IV-push option,
225 Id.
226 Id. (citing Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development,
in The Liability Maze 334, 335-336 (Peter W Huber & Robert E. Litan eds. 199 1)).
227 Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J. concurring).
229 Id.
229 Id. at 1218 (Alito, J., dissenting).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 1219.
232 Id. at 1220.
233 Id. at 1222-1227.
234 Id. at 1222-1223.
23 Id. at 1223-1224.
236 Id. at 1225.
231 Id. at 1227.
238 Id.
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they created a conflict with federal law if a jury concluded that an FDA-approved
method of administration was inappropriate .2 9 Finally, the dissent maintained that
juries were not well-suited to engage in the sort of cost-benefit analysis that FDA
performed . 24 0 While juries tended to focus on the specific design or warning label
that allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury, FDA was better equipped to consider
the interests of all potential users of the drug.24 'I The dissent also observed that
"FDA conveys its warnings with one voice, rather than whipsawing the medical
community with 50 (or more) potentially conflicting ones. "1242 For these reasons, the
dissent concluded that the plaintiff's failure to warn claim should be invalidated
on conflict preemption grounds.243
V. LOWER COURT DECISIONS AF TER WYETH
There are several federal preemption issues that were not addressed by the Wyeth
Court and remain unresolved. The first is whether failure to warn claims under
state tort law should be preempted on actual conflict grounds when FDA is aware
of a risk but does not require a change in the labeling. The second issue is whether
failure to warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs are preempted be-
cause FDA does not permit their product to deviate from the labeling of the listed
drug upon for which they substitute. In these cases, plaintiffs argued that failure to
warn claims should not be preempted because drug manufacturers have the power
to change product labeling without FDA advance approval by submitting a CBE
supplement. So far, most courts have relied heavily on the reasoning of the Wyeth
majority to find that these claims are not preempted.
A. SSRI Cases
1. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.
The first preemption issue is illustrated by Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.2" Colacicco
was one of several pre- Wyeth cases that held that failure to warn claims could be
preempted when FDA had determined that there is not enough scientific evidence
to justify changing the existing labeling. 45 After the Wyeth case was decided, the
Supreme Court vacated the Colacicco decision and remanded the case to the circuit
court for further consideration in light of its finding that FDA approval of drug
labeling in Wyeth did not impliedly preempt state law failure to warn claims.2 46
Colacicco involved an appeal from two cases where adult patients committed
suicide after being treated for depression with selective serotonin uptake inhibitors
(SSRIs). 47 In the first case, the decedent, Lois Colacicco committed suicide within
a month after being treated for depression with a drug containing paroxetine hydro-
239 Id.
240 Id. at 1229-1230.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1230.
243 Id. at 123 1.
244 521 E3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2000).
241 See also Horne v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 541 E Supp. 2d 768 (WD.N.C. 2008); Dobbs
v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 E Supp. 2d 1275 (WD. Okla. 2008); Sykes v. Glaxo-Smith Kline, 484 1- Supp.
2d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2007); but see Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind.
2008) (finding no preemption).
246 See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009).
247 Id. at 256.
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chloride, the active ingredient contained in Paxil . 4 1 After her death, the decedent's
husband brought suit against Apotex, the manufacturer of a generic version of
Paxil, which had actually been prescribed to the decedent, and SmithKline Beecham,
the manufacturer of Paxil itself, alleging that the labeling on these products did
not sufficiently warn about the increased risk of emergent suicidality in adults who
took paroxetine. 4 1 The lower court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the
plaintiff's claim was impliedly preempted."' 0 In a companion case, McNellis ex rel.
DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc., the decedent, Theodore DeAngelis committed suicide less
than two weeks after ingesting Zoloft, which had been prescribed for depression
and anxiety."5 ' The decedent's daughter subsequently brought suit against Pfizer, the
manufacturer of Zoloft, arguing that the suicide warning on Zoloft's labeling was
inadequate .2 12 When Pfizer asked for a summary judgment on grounds of federal
preemption, the trial court denied its motion .
2
1
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that state law failure to
warn claims could be preempted on actual conflict groundS. 2  The court began with
a discussion of the presumption against preemption .2 5 Two of the defendants argued
that the presumption was not applicable because the federal government, rather than
the states, had traditionally regulated drug labeling. 5 ' However, the court rejected
these arguments relying on the fact that the Supreme Court had applied the pre-
sumption in Hillsborough County v. A utomated Medical Laboratories ,"' a case which
involved a conflict between federal and local regulation of blood plasma centers. 5 '
A third defendant contended that the presumption against preemption should not
apply to any implied preemption case .259 The court observed that Hillsborough County
had applied the presumption against preemption in a conflict preemption situation,
but it also conceded that "the extent to which the Court relied on the presumption
in the context of its conflict analysis was not clear."12 10 Ultimately, the court in Co-
lacicco recognized that the presumption against preemption was applicable but it
also noted the tension between the presumption and implied conflict preemption .
2 1
1
This suggests that it believed that presumption's effect might be weaker in implied
preemption cases than in express preemption cases.
The Colacicco court went on to observe that instances where it was impossible
to comply with both federal and state law were rare .262 Therefore, the court limited
its inquiry to whether state law failure to warn claims could "stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Con-
gress."1263 The court first examined FDA's CBE regulation 2 6 which allowed a drug
manufacturer to change its product labeling without prior FDA approval when
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F Supp. 2d 514, 537-539 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
25I Colacicco, 521 EMd at 256-257.
252 Id. at 257.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 276.
255 Id. at 262.
256 Id. at 263.
257 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)
258 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 263.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 265.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 266.
263 Id. at 266 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985)).
2- 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2009).
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such a change would "add strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution or
adverse reaction. 2165 According to the plaintiffs, since the regulation allowed drug
manufacturers to strengthen or augment their warnings, FD~s labeling require-
ments must be regarded as minimum standards.266 Consequently, tort liability
would complement FDA's labeling regulations, not conflict with them, if drug
manufacturers changed their labeling in order to avoid such liability.2 67 However,
the defendants pointed out that because FDA could order drug manufacturers to
discontinue labeling changes adopted pursuant to § 314.70(c), drug labeling ulti-
mately reflected the FDA's judgment, not the manufacturer's, about the information
that should be included .2 6 1
The court considered three situations where a conflict might arise. The first was
where neither FDA nor the manufacturer had addressed the particular risk. This was
arguably the situation in Wyeth and one where a court was least likely to find that an
actual conflict existed. The court in Colacicco made it clear that it would not rule on
whether mere approval of particular labeling by FDA would be sufficient to preempt
state tort claims based on a drug company's failure to strengthen its warning. 269 At
the other end of the spectrum was the situation where the manufacturer sought to
change a drug's labeling and FDA refused to approve the proposed change. This
would almost certainly give rise to an actual conflict. Even the plaintiffs conceded
this by arguing that their failure to warn claims should not be preempted unless FDA
explicitly rejected a drug manufacturer's request to modify its product labeling.27 0 The
court then concluded that the third situation applied, namely that the manufacturer
had not formally sought to strengthen the labeling but that FDA had publically
indicated that it was satisfied with the existing labeling.
In this case, the court observed, FDA had not ordered the defendants to remove lan-
guage added to existing labeling under § 314.70(c), nor had the defendants attempted
to change the labeling. 71 However, the court declared that deliberate inaction by a
federal agency might be sufficient to preempt a state tort claim .2 2 Furthermore, the
court pointed out that FDA had actively monitored the possible association between
SSRIs and suicide for nearly 20 years and had ultimately concluded that the warn-
ings proposed by the plaintiffs were without scientific basis and, therefore, could be
deemed false and misleading.273 Thus, if the defendants had added a warning about
adult suicidality to their labeling, FDA would probably have withdrawn its approval
of the drug until the new labeling was removed .2 74 This reasoning led the court to
conclude that "a state law obligation to include a warning asserting the existence of an
association between SSRIs and suicidality directly conflicts with FD~s oft-repeated
conclusion that the evidence did not support such an association. 2175 Consequently,
the court in Colacicco concluded that, under the circumstances, the plaintiffs' failure
to warn claims were preempted by FDAs determination that there was no proven
link between SSRIs and adult suicidality 
27 6
265 Id.
266 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 268.
267 Id.
261 Id. at 268-269.
26 Id. at 27 1-272.
270 Id. at 272.
271 Id. at 269.
272 Id.
27 Id. at 269-27 1.
274 Id. at 271.
275 Id.
276 Id.
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At the present time, it remains to be seen whether the Court's reasoning in Wyeth
will lead to a finding of no preemption when the circuit court reexamines its deci-
sion in Colacicco. First of all, the court will have to reconsider its holding in light
of the fact that the Court in Wyeth indicated that a robust presumption against
preemption applied to implied preemption cases. Second, the court will have to
take into account the Wyeth Court's unwillingness to give much deference to FDA's
Preamble on Preemption and its determination that manufacturers have the prin-
cipal responsibility for drug safety. All this would seem to weaken the defendant's
obstacle preemption argument. The court will also have to decide what effect a drug
manufacturer's failure to seek modification of a drug's labeling by means of a CBE
supplement has on a conflict preemption claim. The Court in Wyeth rejected the
notion that FDA takes the lead in promoting drug safety while drug manufacturers
play a passive role. Rather, the Court declared "that manufacturers, not the FDA,
bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times."" 7 In addition, the
Wyeth Court refused to preempt the plaintiff's claims on the basis of impossibility
because the defendant provided no evidence that FDA would have refused to allow
it to strengthen the existing warnings. 7 8 Indeed, the Court accepted the state trial
court's finding that neither the manufacturer nor FDA "gave more than passing
attention" to the question of whether IV-drip administration was preferable to
IV-push administration. 7 ' Furthermore, the manufacturer did not provide FDA
with an evaluation or analysis about the dangers of IV-push administration of
Phenergan. 8 0 This led the Court in Wyeth to declare that it "cannot credit Wyeth's
contention that the FDA would have prevented it from adding a stronger warning
about the IV-push method of intravenous administration."2 8 ' The Court concluded
by stating that "[tjhe CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen
its warning, and the mere fact that the FDA approved Phenergan's label does not
establish that it would have prohibited such a change." 82 However, in Colacicco, the
court pointed out that FDA had actively monitored the risk of suicidality in adults
for more than 20 years and concluded that decided not order Paxil's manufacturer
to strengthen the drug's labeling because it concluded that the suicide warnings
desired by the plaintiffs were without scientific basis and, therefore, would be false
and misleading. 2
3
2. Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp
Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.28 involved the antidepressant drug, Paxil .
2
11
In that case, the plaintiffs' daughter committed suicide two days after being treated
for depression with Paxil .2 11 Her parents brought suit against SmithKline Beeecham,
the drug's manufacturer, alleging that the company failed to disclose the fact that
277 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
271 Id. at 1198.
279 Id. at 1198-1199.
280 Id. at 1199.
281 Id.
282 Id.
"I Colacicco, 521 EM3 at 269, see also Douglas G. Smith, Preemption After Wyeth v. Levine, 70
OHIO ST. LIJ. 1435, 1466-67 (2009) (concluding that Wyeth supports the notion that the preemption
doctrine should apply when the defendant demonstrates that FDA actually considered the risks at issue
and did not require a stronger warning).
11 596 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 20 10).
21 Id. at 389.
286 Id.
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Paxil increased the risk of suicide among young adults.2 7 The lower court ruled
that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted and granted summary judgment in favor
of the manufacturer."' 8 However, this decision was reversed on appeal."' 9
The federal appeals court began by describing Wyeth as "a case that represents
a sea change in the way courts are to consider issues of federal preemption.1
2 0
With that in mind, the court declared that it would review the plaintiffs' appeal in
light of the Wyeth holding.29 ' In so doing, the court gave considerable weight to the
Wyeth opinion's statement that in order to argue successfully for federal preemp-
tion, a manufacturer must present "clear evidence" that FDA would have rejected
the proposed change in the drug's label." 292 The court also relied on Wyeth to con-
clude that a drug manufacturer's ability to make labeling changes in accordance
with the FDA's CBE regulation underscored the fact that "a manufacturer bears
responsibility for the content of its label at all times. "1293
In order to determine whether the defendant had satisfied the "clear evidence"
standard prescribed by Wyeth, the court compared the regulatory histories of
Phenergan and Paxil. 94 After reviewing the Wyeth Court's account of the regulatory
history of Phenergan, the court observed that the Supreme Court had concluded
that the defendant failed to present clear evidence that FDA would have refused to
approve a labeling change in that case even though the FDA had seriously considered
and rejected a warning that was a similar to the one proposed by the plaintiff29 ' In
comparison with this experience, the court concluded that the evidence was even less
compelling that FDA would have rejected an effort by SmithKline Beecham to add
a warning to Paxil about the risk of suicide. 916 Consequently, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted. 9 '
B. Generic Drug Cases
Since the Wyeth decision, a number of courts have considered whether the FDCA
impliedly preempts failure to warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs
who have failed to strengthen the labeling on their products. 98 Almost all of these
courts have relied, at least in part, on Wyeth to support a finding of no preemp-
tion .299 The great majority of these cases have involved metoclopramide, a drug used
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 396.
280 Id. at 39 1.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 391.
293 Id. at 392.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 393
291 Id. at 3 93-95.
297 Id. at 397.
298 See, eg, Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. wyeth, Inc., 588
F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009); Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D.N.H. 2009);
Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (WD. Okla. 2009); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 642 FE Supp.
2d 677 (WD. Ky. 2009).
21 See, e.g., Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009); Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceuti-
cal Co., 659 F Supp. 2d 279 (D.N.H. 2009); Stacel v. TEVA Pharmaceuticals, USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899
(N.D. 111. 2009); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (WD. Okla. 2009); Demahy v. Actavis,
Inc., 586 F Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. La. 2008), affd, 593 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 2010); but see Morris v.Wyeth,
Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 677 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (holding that failure to warn claims were preempted); Wilson
v. PLIVA, Inc., 640 E Supp. 2d 879 (W.D. Ky. 2009);
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to treat gastric reflux disease and other gastrointestinal ailments. Unfortunately,
metoclopramide allegedly caused tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological move-
ment disorder, when ingested over for long periods of time.310 Regal, the "listed" or
name brand drug,""0 ' was approved by FDA pursuant to the new drug application
(NDA) process. However, the generic versions were approved as abbreviated new
drug applications (ANDA) under the terms of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments
to FDCA. 02 The proposed labeling submitted for FDA approval by the generic
drug manufacturer under an ANDA must be the same as the labeling of the listed
drug for which it is the equivalent. The question is if state tort law can require
generic drug manufacturers to change their labeling when new risks are discovered
or whether they can wait until either FDA or the manufacturer of the listed drug
takes action first.
1. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc
A number of courts addressed this issue prior to the Wyeth decision."' 3 One of
the first was Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 101an unreported California case decided in 2006.
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that although FDA had approved Reglan and its
various generic substitutes for only 12 weeks of use, the labeling of these products
substantially understated the side effects of prolonged use. 305 The plaintiff claimed
that this defective labeling caused her physician to prescribe metoclopramide for
more than four years, causing her to develop tardive dyskinesia. One of the generic
manufacturers, Purepac, moved for sunmmary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's
claims were preempted by the FDCA and its implementing regulations."30 According
to Purepac, requiring it to add additional warnings about the risks of long-term
use of metoclopramide would conflict with federal law because FDA regulations
prohibited a generic manufacturer from altering a brand name drug's labeling. 07
The court began its consideration of the defendant's preemption argument by
observing that FDA in its Preamble on Preemption had declared prescription drug
labeling to be solely a federal responsibility and consequently "any State law 'fail-
ure to warn' claims are necessarily preempted to the extent that they conflict with
federal regulatory law by requiring additional labeling, i.e., additional warnings."3"'
The court also relied on the reasoning of a federal district court in In re Bextra and
Clebrex Marketing Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation . 3 1' That case
held that state law failure to warn claims ''were preempted by FDA regulations
10 See Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 642 F Supp. 2d 677, 679 (WD. Ky. 2009).
301 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(i)(I)(2000) declared that a listed drug is one that has been approved
for safety and effectiveness by FDA pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2000).
302 Now codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000).
303 Cf. Wilson v. PLIVA, Inc., 640 E Supp. 2d 879 (WD. Ky. 2009); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F
Supp. 2d 861 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (holding failure to warn claims were preempted); Mason v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 546 E Supp. 2d 618 (C.D. 111. 2008) (same) with Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F Supp. 2d 421
(D. Vt.2008) holding that failure to warn claims were not preempted); Demahy v. Wyeth, Inc., 586 F
Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. La. 2008), aff'd, B F3d B (5th Cir. 2010) (same); McKenney v. Purepas Pharm. Co.,
83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810 (Ct. App. 2008) (same).
~2006 WL 2692469 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2006); aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 85
Cal. Rptr. 3d 299 (Ct. App. 2008) [hereinafter cited as "slip opinion"].
11 Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 299, 305 (Ct. App. 2008).
306 Id. at 306.
10 Conte, slip opinion at *I
300 Id. at *4.
- 2006 WL 2374742 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006).
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because FD~s interpretation of the preemptive effects of its regulations set forth in
the January 24, 2006 Preamble, is entitled to deference. " 10 The court also noted that
the Bextra court acknowledged that FD~s position in the Preamble represented a
shift in its former view on preemption, but declared that it should still accord def-
erence to the Preamble." ' The court concluded by finding that the issues involved
were similar to those of Bexstra and Colacicco "insofar as their resolution turns
on whether the recently promulgated FDA Preamble preempts State law 'failure
to warn' claims" and since it found the reasoning of the two cases very persuasive,
the court granted Purepac's motion for summary judgment."' 2
The superior court subsequently granted a summary judgment in favor of Wy-
eth, the manufacturer of Reglan and all the manufacturers of the generic drug."' 3
In dismissing the case against Wyeth, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed
to show that her physician relied on the product labeling disseminated by Wyeth
and that the manufacturer of a listed drug had no duty to patients who took only
the generic version of the drug.' 14 The court granted summary judgment in favor
of the manufacturers of generic metoclopramide on grounds of federal preemp-
tion and because it found that plaintiff's physician had not relied on the product
labeling."'
On appeal, a California intermediate appellate court ruled that Wyeth owed a
common law duty of due care that was not limited to those who prescribed or con-
sumed Reglan, but extended to physicians who might foreseeably rely on the listed
drug's labeling even though they prescribed the generic version of the drug."' 6 For
this reason, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Wyeth. 17 However,
it affirmed the summary in favor of the manufacturers of generic metoclopramide
because the plaintiff was unable to prove that she relied on any product safety
information supplied by them."' The appeals court disposed of the preemption
issue by declaring that "it is unnecessary for us to reach the generic defendants'
further contention that federal law preempts state tort claims based upon allegedly
inadequate drug labeling.""' 9
2. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.
Recently, two courts have appeal have ruled that the FDCA did not preempt
failure to warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs. One of these was
Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc."'0 In Mensing, the plaintiff brought suit against the manu-
facturers of Reglan and generic versions of metoclopramide, claiming that the
drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia . 2 1 The plaintiff alleged that the
drug's labeling failed to warn about the dangers of tardive dyskinesia associated
3"0 Conte, slip opinion at *5.
311 Id. at *6.
312 Id.
.. See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2008).
31 Id.
31 Id.
316 Id. at 304-305, but see Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs,
74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 839, 911 (2009) (concluding that most courts have refused to hold brand-name
manufacturers liable to consumers of generic versions of a drug)..
11 Id. at 305.
318 Id.
31 Id.
32 588 F3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009).
321 See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Minn. 2008).
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with long-term use.322 The lower court ruled that failure to warn claims against the
generic manufacturers were preempted and dismissed them . 2 1
On appeal, the circuit court first considered the presumption against preemp-
tion .1 2 ' The court acknowledged that the Wyeth court had noted the historic coexis-
tence of state tort law and federal regulation of prescription dr-ugs. 25 It also declared
that after Wyeth it must treat with skepticism any assertion by the defendants
that Congress intended to silently grant tort immunity to most prescription drug
manufacturers. 2 ' The defendants tried to distinguish Wyeth by claiming that it was
solely concerned with the tort liability of brand name manufacturers, but the court
in Mensing disagreed, pointing that virtually all post- Wyeth decisions had refused
to preempt failure to warn claims against manufacturers of generic drugs."2 '
Turning to the question of whether it was "impossible" for drug manufacturers
to modify existing product labeling because FDA regulations required generic drug
labeling to be the same as the labeling of a listed drug, the court quoted Wyeth's
admonition that "[i]mpossibility pre-emption [was] a demanding defense.""2 ' The
generic drug manufacturers pointed to a federal regulation that provided that FDA
could withdraw its approval of a generic drug if its label was "no longer consistent"
with the name brand label . 29 This provision prohibited them from utilizing the
CBE process to make a unilateral labeling change without first obtaining FDA
approval. 3 ' However, the court responded that even if the CBE process were not
available, the defendants could have used the prior approval process.3 3'
In this case we need not decide whether generic manufacturers may uni-
laterally enhance a label warning through the CBE procedure because the
generic defendants could have at least proposed a label change that the FDA
could receive and impose uniformly on all metoclopramnide manufacturers
if approved (expended the majority of its discussion) is immaterial to the
preemption analysis in light of this clear directive to generic manufacturers
and the availability of the prior approval process.
Furthermore, the court declared that 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) imposed a duty on
generic drug manufacturers to initiate labeling changes by whatever means was
available when they became aware of new risks associated with the use of their
product . 3 2 The court pointed out that this provision required that drug labeling
"shall be revised as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious
hazard with a drug." 33 Citing Wyeth, the court concluded that this provision did
not allow manufacturers of generic drugs "passively to accept the inadequacy of
their drug's label as they market and profit from it."313 4 Instead, they must do more
and initiate changes in labeling rather than waiting for the manufacturers of listed
drugs to do so. This duty would require them to use the prior approval process if
the CBE process were not available: 3 '
"I Id. at 1057.
323 Id. at 1064-1065.
34See Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 EM3 603, 607-608 (8th Cir. 2010).
SId. at 607.
326 Id. at 607.
321 Id. at 607-608.
12 Id. at 608 (quoting from Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199).
12 Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (2009)).
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 608-609.
13 Id. (quoting from 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2009)).
331 Id. at 609.
33 Id.
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The availability of one particular procedure (the CBE process, on which the
district court expended the majority of its discussion) is immaterial to the
preemption analysis in light of this clear directive to generic manufacturers
and the availability of the prior approval process.
In response, the defendants argued that 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 limits the prior ap-
proval procedure to "major changes," while changes to enhance warnings were
solely within the purview of the CBE process.3 36 However, the court rejected this
interpretation as "too restrictive.13 7 It pointed out that while 21 C.F.R. § 314.70
established various methods of proposing changes to approved drugs, it repeatedly
used the nonrestrictive phrase "[tlhese changes include, but are not limited to" in
order to identify the types of changes manufacturers can propose through each
kind of supplement. 3 8 Thus, the court concluded that § 314.70 did not manifest an
intent on the part of Congress or FDA to prohibit manufacturers of generic drugs
from utilizing the prior approval process.
339
The court then considered whether it was appropriate to impose liability for
failing to propose a change in labeling when it was uncertain whether FDA would
have approved the requested change."' Quoting from Wyeth, the court declared
"[a]bsent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to [the
drug's] label, we would not conclude that it was impossible for [the manufacturer]
to comply with both federal and state requirements."31 4' However, the court pointed
out that in this case, the record did not contain "clear evidence" that FDA would
have rejected a proposed labeling change had one been made .3 42 For these reasons,
the court concluded that compliance with both state and federal requirements was
not impossible. 43
The court then addressed the generic manufacturers' obstacle preemption
argument. According to the defendants, proposing a label change as potentially
required by state law, would require them to conduct expensive clinical studies,
thereby frustrating the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to bring low
cost generic drugs to market quickly.3 "4 In response, the court observed that the
scientific substantiation necessary to support a proposed change in labeling did
not require the manufacturer to conduct new tests. 11In fact, as the Wyeth Court
pointed out, multiple reports of adverse drug experiences might be sufficient to
justify a manufacturer's request for a labeling change .3 46 The court concluded by
declaring that the state law duty to warn did not obstruct the purposes and objectives
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. 47 Rather, as Wyeth indicated, such actions
reinforced "the FDC~s premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary
responsibility for their drug labeling at all times.
3
1
48
336 Id.
33 Id.
SId. at 609-610 (citing 21 C.F.R. '314.70(b)(2), (c) (2), (d)(2) (2009)).
SId. at 6 10.
340 Id.
34 Id. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
342 Id. at 610-611.
14 Id. at 611.
"'4 Id.
14 Id. at 611-612.
14 Id. at 612.
34 Id.
Is Id. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.)
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3. Demahy v. Actavis, Inc.
Recently, in Demahy v. Actavis, Inc '4 another federal appeals court also ruled
that state law failure to warn claims against generic drug manufacturers were not
preempted by the FDCA. As in Mensing, the plaintiff came down with tardive dys-
kinesia after taking metoclopramide for four years to treat her acid reflux disease."' 0
The plaintiff brought suit based on the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA)
against Actavis (formerly Purepac), the manufacturer of the generic metoclopramide
that she consumed. 5 ' The defendant argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed
as a matter of federal conflict preemption because the label and package insert for
its generic metoclopramide could not be altered from the labeling that had been
approved for name brand metoclopramide. 5 2 The lower court, however, ruled that
the plaintiff's claims were not preempted .3
5 3
On appeal, the court began by declaring that "[tjhe Supreme Court ruled in [ Wy-
eth] that the federal regulatory regime governing pharmaceuticals does not preempt
a state-law failure to warn claim against the manufacturer of a name brand drug"3154
The defendant tried to distinguish Wyeth by claiming that manufacturers of generic
drugs, unlike those of name brand drugs, could not change the labeling of their
products unilaterally through the CBE process because generic drugs had to retain
the same labeling as chemically similar brand name drugs. 55 The court conceded
that the Wyeth Court did rely on part on the availability of the CBE process to
conclude that it was not impossible for a name brand manufacturer to comply with
federal and state labeling requirements. 56 Nevertheless, the court declared that the
Wyeth case had some bearing of the defendant's situation as well. 5 '
Citing Wyeth, the court stated that the presumption against preemption cautioned
against a finding of federal preemption. 5 ' Moreover, the court noted that five
members of the Wyeth Court had held that the presumption applied "to conflict
preemption cases at least where, as here, the question is whether federal regulation
of prescription drugs preempts state-law failure to warn claims. 31 59 Furthermore,
the court declared, "the bar to a finding of preemption [was] even higher because
federal law provides no remedy for an injured consumer.""' Finally, the court cited
Wyeth for the proposition that the failure of Congress to expressly preempt failure to
warn claims against drug manufacturers when it had done so against manufacturers
of medical devices militated against of finding of conflict preemption. 6 '
Turning to the impossibility argument, the court echoed Wyeth, concluding that
"[r]equiring that the conflict be one of 'physical impossibility' readily suggests that
this is a 'demanding defense."36 The court acknowledged that the Hatch-Wax-
man Amendments required that the labeling of the generic drug be identical to
34 593 F.3 428 (8th Cir. 2010).
SSee Demnahy v. Wyeth, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643-64 (E.D. La. 2008).
SId. at 644.
352 Id.
31 Id. at 662.
31 Demahy, 393 EM3 at 433.
35 Id.
356 Id.
357 Id.
35 Id. at 434.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 435.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 436 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 11 99).
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that of the name brand drug at the time that the manufacturer sought an ANDA
approval."' 3 However, again referring to Wyeth, the court pointed out that "it has
remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the manufacturer bears
responsibility for the content of the label at all times.""~ This means that the de-
fendant had an obligation to inform FDA that long-term use of metoclopramide
posed a serious hazard to consumers and to seek a change in the labeling. 365 The
defendant also argued that FDA might withdraw its approval for the drug if it
concluded that the manufacturer lacked "substantial evidence that the drug will
have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended or suggested in the labeling thereof "161 However, the court
responded by observing that the Court in Wyeth had stated that it would find it
"difficult to accept" that FDA would take punitive action against a manufacturer
for strengthening a warning. 6 '
The court then discussed the various methods a manufacturer could employ to
change a drug's labeling. The court first examined the CBE supplement procedure
and concluded that it was the best suited to strengthen existing labeling to reflect
"information not previously submitted to the [FDA]." 6 ' After a detailed discussion
of FDA statements and regulations, the court found that FDA had not expressly
prohibited generic drug manufacturers from using the CBE process."6 ' Consequently,
it declared that "[wlithout explicit reference to the use of the CBE process by generic
manufacturers, we decline to read in a bar to its use." 7 ' The court also determined
that generic drug manufacturers could seek a change in labeling through the prior
approval process.3 7 ' Finally, the court concluded that while generic drug manu-
facturers could not warn healthcare professional about newly discovered risks by
means of "Dear Doctor" letters without prior FDA approval, they could suggest
that FDA send such letters on their behalf."37
Finally, the defendant argued that it would be unable to comply with state law
duties and FDA requirements if FDA refused to approve changes in labeling that
would satisfy the state law duty to warn. 73 However, the court responded by pointed
out that the Wyeth Court had indicated that "absent clear evidence that the FDA
would not have approved a change to [the drug's] label, we will not conclude that
it was impossible for the [manufacturer] to comply with both federal and state
requirements.""' Thus, the court concluded that compliance with both state and
federal requirements was not impossible. 7 '
The Demahy court then considered whether state law failure to warn claims
stood as an "'obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress' as embodied in the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and
363 Id.
3Id. at 437 (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197-1198).
365 Id.
36Id. at 438 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 35 5(e)).
36I Id. at 439.
36 Id. (quoting Rules and Regulations, HHS, FDA, 21 CFR Parts 314, 601 and 814, Supplemental
Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics and Medical Devices, 73 Fed.
Reg. 49,603, 49,604 (Aug. 22, 2008)).
36I Id. at 439-44.
11 Id. at 444.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 444-445.
11 Id. at 446.
1Id. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
37 Id.
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the FDCA. "I" According to the court, in order to for an obstacle preemption claim
to prevail, it must impute to Congress an intent that manufacturers of name brand
drugs bear the sole responsibility for responding to newly discovered risks even if
they no longer manufacture the drug in question."' 7 In addition, the court declared
that it would have to assume that Congress either intended for name brand drug
manufacturers to be liable for all failure to warn claims, including those brought by
consumers of generic drugs, or that such consumers would be left without a rem-
edy."' 8 It was clear that the court was unwilling to make such an assumption."7 '
In response, the defendant argued that satisfying the state law duty to warn
would require generic drug companies to perform duplicative studies, trials and
other data gathering exercises in order to determine whether labeling changes
were necessary. 8 0 However, the court found that reasonable evidence of a serious
hazard with a drug did not have to be based on tests performed by the generic drug
company, but could be based on studies conducted by others.3"' Furthermore, the
court observed that "nothing about the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, and their
goal of cheaper drugs, obviates the concomitant prescription that all drugs, even
cheaper ones, remain safe." 8 ' Echoing Wyeth, the court declared that "failure to
warn actions ... lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the FDA,
bear primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times." 83
The court concluded by finding that the defendant had not provided sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption against preemption . 8 4 According to the
court, "[t]he presumption reflects the judiciary's reluctance to find the intention
of a coordinate federal branch to supplant state law." 8 ' Accordingly, the appeals
court in Demahy affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the plaintiff. 8 '
4. Other Lower Court Cases
Several other lower court cases have relied the reasoning of the Wyeth decision to
conclude that failure to warn claims against the manufacturers of generic drugs were
not preempted. 8 7 In Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that she ingested
metoclopramide from March, 2000 until June, 2006 and that this long-term use of
the drug caused her to develop tardive dyskinesia. 88 She argued that the defendants,
distributors of Reglan, the name brand drug and generic metoclopramide, failed
to warn about the risk of long-term use of the drug and failed to request a labeling
revision to FDA. 8 ' The defendants responded by moving to dismiss the plaintiff's
claims on the basis of federal preemption. 9 0
376 Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-373 (2000)).
11 Id. at 447.
378 Id.
37 Id. at 449.
380 Id. at 447.
381 Id.
382 Id. at 448.
383 Id. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202).
"I Id. at 449.
383 Id.
386 Id.
387 See Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D.N.H. 2009); Stacel v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals, USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. 111. 2009); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F Supp. 2d
1262 (WD. Okla. 2009).
381 Schrock, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
389 Id.
39 Id.
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The court began by observing that the drug manufacturer made similar pre-
emption arguments in Wyeth. In resolving these preemption arguments, the
Court in Wyeth invoked the presumption against preemption."9 ' In addition, the
court pointed out, the Wyeth Court declared that Congress "adopted a rule of
construction to make it clear that manufacturers remain responsible for updating
their labels."111 2 Finally, quoting from Wyeth, the court declared that "[u]nless the
prescription drug manufacturer makes a clear evidentiary showing that the FDA
would not have approved a change in the label, a court may not conclude that it
was impossible for the prescription drug manufacturer to comply with both federal
and state requirements." 9 3 Based on these considerations, the court rejected the
defendant's impossibility argument. 9 '
The court also considered the defendant's claim that failure to warn claims stood
as an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of the FDCA. Once again, the court
relied heavily on the reasoning of Wyeth. First, it agreed with the Wyeth Court
that the failure of Congress to expressly preempt state tort claims was "powerful
evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means
of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness." 9 ' Second, following the Wyeth Court's
lead, the court refused to rely on FDA's Preamble on Preemption. 9 ' The court
concluded by declaring "fals in Wyeth, however, this Court finds that there is a
longstanding coexistence of state and federal law in the regulatory history and
background relevant to this case." 9 ' Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants'
obstacle preemption claim. 99
Another federal district court reached a similar conclusion in Stacel v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals, USA."' 9 The plaintiff in that case contended that she developed
lupus as a result of consuming a generic version of minocycline manufactured by
the defendant, Teva.400 The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Teva negligently failed
to warn about the risk of drug-induced lupus.40 ' Teva moved to dismiss, arguing that
the plaintiff's claims were preempted by the labeling requirements of the FDCA.
402
Citing Wyeth, the court began its analysis by invoking the presumption against
preemption .4 3 After reviewing the various procedures by which manufacturers
could change drug labeling, the court declared that while the Court's analysis in
Wyeth was not directly controlling, it concluded that "key parts of its analysis are
applicable here."14 4
First, the court noted that the Wyeth Court had found that when Congress
amended the FDCA in 1982, it expressly declared that state-law claims should not
he preempted unless there was a "direct and positive" conflict with the FDCA .
4 0
1
The court also quoted the Wyeth opinion for the proposition that "the manufacturer
''Id. at 1264.
SId. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194.
SId. at 1264-1265 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198-1199.
11 Id. at 1265.
SId. (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199.1200).
36Id. (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.1201).
39 Id.
398 Id.
1" 620 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. 111. 2009).
400 Id. at 90 1.
40 Id.
402 Id. at 902.
40 Id. at 903 (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194.
40 Id. at 904.
11 Id. (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195).
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bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times." 06 In addition, the court
reiterated the Wyeth Court's skepticism about the defendant's claim that the FDA
would treat a drug with altered labeling as "misbranded. " 07 Finally, the court agreed
with Wyeth that congressional silence on preemption, coupled with its awareness
of the existence of tort litigation, indicated that it "did not intend FDA oversight
to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness."40'
According to the Stacel court, the preemption argument hinged on whether
manufacturers of generic drugs could utilize the CBE process to alter existing label-
ing. 17 As the court declared, "[ijf generic manufacturers can utilize the CBE, then
the logic of [Wyeth] is directly applicable. " 10 Teva argued that FDA regulations
prohibited manufacturers of generic drugs from utilizing the CBE procedure.4"'
Specifically, Teva pointed to language in a proposed rule which declared that
"CBE changes are not available for generic drugs approved under an abbrevi-
ated new drug application under 21 U.S.C. 355(j). To the contrary, a generic drug
manufacturer is required to conform to the approved labeling of the listed drug."4"'
In response, the court pointed out that the Wyeth Court had applied Skidmore
deference to FD~s Preamble on Preemption and concluded that it did not deserve
any deference because it contradicted every statement on the issue that came from
Congress."' Taking its cue from Wyeth, the court in Stacel also declined to accept
FDA's preemption argument .4 14 Instead, the court concluded that manufacturers
of generic drugs could change the labeling of their products without prior FDA
approval by utilizing the CBE procedure .4151 The court also determined that failure
to warn claims would not frustrate the congressional purpose behind the FDCA
or the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. 416 Echoing Wyeth, the court declared that
"[tjhe underlying purpose of the FDCA is not making sure that that drugs can be
quickly and cheaply brought to market, but rather to assure that the drugs are safe
when they are brought to market.""' Accordingly, the court refused to conclude
that the plaintiff's claims were preempted by federal law .411
A New Hampshire federal district court reached a similar conclusion recently in
Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co."'9 The plaintiff in that case was diagnosed
with Stevens-Johnson syndrome which progressed to toxic epidermal necrosis of
the skin and mucous membranes as a result of consuming Sulindac, a generic drug
manufactured by the defendant drug companies.420 The plaintiff brought a number
of claims against the defendants, including failure to warn . 42 1 The defendants, in
turn, moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff's claims were
406 Id. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197).
SId. (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197).
SId. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200).
40 Id. at 905.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 906.
4"I Id. (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs,
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2849 n. 1 (Jan. 16, 2008)).
41 Id. (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.)
414 Id. at 907.
415 Id.
416 Id.
411 Id. (Citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195-1198).
418 Id.
119 659 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D.N.H. 2009).
421 Id. at 282.
421 Id.
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preempted Title I of the Drug Price Restoration Act of 1984, a part of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments to the FDCA .4 2 2 However, the court denied the defendants'
motion, concluding that "[tlhe Supreme Court's recent decision on the preemptive
effect of federal drug regulation on state tort law in Wyeth v. Levine" makes it clear
that the plaintiff's claims are not preempted .
4 2
1
The court began its analysis (after discussing FDA labeling regulations and the
ANDA process) with a reference to Wyeth and the presumption against preemp-
tion. The court observed that the Supreme Court had affirmed in Wyeth that "'.[iln
all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated..
in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' we start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.""2 The
court went on to declare that Wyeth not only affirmed that the presumption against
preemption applied to implied preemption claims, but it also made it clear that the
presumption applied to failure to warn claims in light of "the historic presence of
state law" in the area of drug regulation .425 Thus, the court concluded, it must evalu-
ate the defendants' preemption claims in light of the assumption "that Congress
does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.14 6 Unfortunately for the
defendants, the court ultimately determined that their preemption arguments did
"not withstand that level of scrutiny.14 7
Turning to the defendants' impossibility preemption argument, the court began
by pointing out that "[ijmpossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.14 8 The
court acknowledged that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments prohibited FDA ap-
proval of an ANDA for a generic drug unless the proposed labeling was the same
as that of the listed drug.42 9 However, the court held that nothing in either the
statutory scheme or FDA regulations made it impossible for the manufacturer
to change the labeling of an ANDA-approved generic drug to comply with a
state law requirement .4 10 In particular, the court relied on the reasoning of the
Wyeth case to conclude that manufacturers of generic drugs could use the CBE
process to effectuate labeling changes to their products.43 'I Finally, the court re-
jected the defendants' argument that FDA would treat a drug as misbranded if
the manufacturer unilaterally changed the approved labeling. 43 2 Echoing Wyeth,
the court declared that "[t]he FDCA does not provide that a drug is misbranded
simply because the manufacturer has altered an FDA-approved label; instead, the
misbranding provision focuses on the substance of the label and, among other
things, proscribes labels that fail to include 'adequate warnings.'14 3 Consequently,
the court concluded that the defendants had failed to satisfy the requirements of
impossibility preemption .4 14
422 Id. at 281.
423 Id.
424 Id. at 291 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95).
425 Id.
426 Id. (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3).
427 Id.
421 Id. at 293 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1193).
429 Id.
410 Id. at 293-302.
43 Id. at 295-302.
432 Id. at 306-307.
41 Id. at 306 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197).
41 Id. at 307 (citing Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197-1198).
2792010
280 ~FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL VL6
The defendants also contended that the plaintiff's failure to warn claims would
frustrate the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments."' 5 According to the defendants, they would have to conduct
duplicative clinical trials in order to generate the information necessary to satisfy
their duty to warn under state law.436 This obligation would increase the cost of
generic drugs and thus frustrate the congressional goal of making available more
low-cost generic drugs by streamlining the procedure for the approval of such
drugs.437 However, the court rejected this argument, pointing out that FDA rules
already required manufacturers of generic drugs to comply with potentially expen-
sive reporting and monitoring requirements.4 8 This strongly suggested that similar
requirements imposed by state law would not be sufficient to undermine Hatch-
Waxman's cost-cutting objectives. 4 9 Finally, the court found that preempting failure
to warn claims would leave injured consumers without a remedy." In the court's
view, if Congress wished to make such a tradeoff, "it surely would have expressed
that intent more clearly.""'1 Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff's failure
to warn claims were not preempted."21
V1. CONCLUSION
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court held that a failure to warn against the
manufacturer of a listed or name brand prescription drug was not impliedly pre-
empted when the manufacturer had not attempted to change the FDA-approved
labeling and FDA had not indicated that there was insufficient scientific evidence
to justify a label change. However, the Wyeth Court did not limit itself to the is-
sues in the case itself, instead, it created a template for courts to follow when they
decide other preemption cases. As the discussion in Part V indicates, the lower
federal courts have not been slow to take advantage of the Wyeth Court's template.
Briefly, there are three steps to the Court's preemption analysis in Wyeth: First,
the Court invokes presumption against preemption, thereby placing the burden on
the defendant to prove convincingly the existence of a conflict. Second, the Court
raises the bar against any impossibility argument by assuming that manufactur-
ers can change a drug's labeling either by seeking FDA approval or by using the
CBE process. To avoid this, the manufacturer must present compelling evidence
that FDA would reject the proposed labeling change. Third, the Court makes it
very difficult for defendants to make an obstacle preemption argument because it
rejects FDAs assertion of a conflict in its Preamble on Preemption and it instead
concludes that Congress has consistently affirmed the role of state tort claims as
an effective complement to FDAs regulatory program.
The first element of the Wyeth Court's preemption analysis is the presumption
against preemption. In Wyeth, the Court declared that "[iln all preemption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has legislated ... in a field which the States
have traditionally occupied," a court must begin its examination of congressional
intent "with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
43 Id.
436 Id.
437 Id.
438 Id.
41 Id. at 308.
44 Id.
" Id. at 309 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).)
442 Id.
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be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. ""4 The Court described the presumption against preemption as one of the
"two cornerstones" of our "preemption jurisprudence."I" It also rejected the notion
that the presumption should not apply in areas, such as drug regulation, where there
was a longstanding and significant pattern of federal regulatory activity."45 Instead,
the Court observed that the presumption "accounts for the historic presence of state
law but does not rely on the absence of federal regulation."" 61 In addition, the Court
emphasized the historic coexistence of state tort law and federal drug regulation"44
and concluded that "Congress took care to preserve state law" when it amended
the FDCA on several occasions."81 This endorsement of the presumption against
preemption has not been lost on the lower federal courts."91
The second element of the Court's analysis involved impossibility preemption.
The Court set the bar high for defendants by observing that "[ijmpossibility pre-
emption is a demanding defense.""540 The Court also dampened the prospects for
a successful impossibility claim by concluding that manufacturers could use the
CBE procedure to change a drug's labeling cheaply and expeditiously."5 ' First, the
Court sidestepped the defendant's claim that it could only use the CBE procedure
to change a drug's labeling "to reflect newly acquired information." 542 Next, it
rejected the contention that changing Phenergan's labeling would cause FDA to
characterize it as a new drug lacking NDA approval or that FDA would treat it
as "misbranded." 543 More importantly, the Court flatly rejected the defendant's
argument that FDA, not the manufacturer, bore the primary responsibility for
drug labeling. Using language that has been subsequently repeated by a number
of lower federal courts, 5" the Wyeth Court declared: 5 5
Yet through many amendments to the FDCA and to FDA regulations, it
has remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the manu-
facturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times. It is
charged both with crafting an adequate label and with ensuring that its
warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the market.
Finally, while the Court acknowledged that FDA could refuse to approve a
proposed labeling change, "absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have
44 Id. at 1194-1 195.
44Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-1 195.
44 Id. at 1195, n. 3
446 Id.
44 Id. at 1200.
448' Id. at 1195-1196.
"~ See, e.g, Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428,434, *3 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.,
588 F.3d 603, 607-608 (8th Cir. 2009); Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 659 E Supp. 2d 279, 291
(D.N.H. 2009); Stacel v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899,903 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Schrock
v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 E Supp. 2d 1262, 1264(WD. Okla. 2009).
41 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199.
451 Id.
452 Id. at 1196-1197 (citing Rules and Regulations, HHS, FDA, 21 CFR Parts 314, 601 and 814,
Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics and Medical
Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,609 (Aug. 22, 2008).
151 Id. atl 1197.
11 See, eg, Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 EMd 428, 448, *4 (5th Cir. 2010); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc.,
588 EMd 603, 612 (8th Cir. 2009); Stacel v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 904 (N.D.
1l1. 2009).
411 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197-1 198.
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approved a change to [the] label," it declined to find that FDA would reject the
proposed change .4 16 All of this suggests that manufacturers who wish to invoke
impossibility preemption as a defense will have to show, at a minimum, that they
made some affirmative effort to change their product's labeling or persuade FDA to
do so. It is even possible that the lower courts will interpret this language in Wyeth
as a requirement that FDA explicitly reject a proposed label change in order to
raise impossibility preemption as a defense.
The third element of the Wyeth Court's analysis was concerned with obstacle
preemption. The Court firmly rejected the defendant's obstacle argument, declaring
that it relied on "an untenable interpretation of congressional intent and an over-
broad view of the agency's power to preempt state law.""'7 The principal source of
this "overbroad view" of FDA's power to preempt state law was its 2006 Preamble
on Preemption .4 8 Had the Court deferred the FDA's position on preemption, as
reflected in the Preamble, the defendant might have prevailed on this issue. How-
ever, the Court declared in no uncertain terms that the Preamble was not entitled
to deference."' In the first place, the Court pointed out that the Preamble suffered
from a number of procedural deficiencies. 460 For example, when FDA published a
notice of proposed rulemaking in December, 2000, it assured the public that the
rule would "not contain policies that have federalism implications or that preempt
State law."146 ' Furthermore, when FDA issued the final rule containing the Preamble,
it did not offer the states or other interested parties a chance to comment or object
even though the Preamble would have a significant adverse effect on state interests. 46 2
Consequently, the Court concluded that FD~s views were "inherently suspect in
light of this procedural failure.14 3
The Court also observed that the Preamble reversed FD~s longstanding po-
sition that state tort law was compatible with FDA regulation of prescription
drugs without providing any sort of reasoned explanation for such a radical
change in its former position .4 64 According to the Court, on numerous occasions
before 2006, FDA characterized its labeling requirements as "a floor upon which
States could build" and it consistently declined to preempt state law failure to
warn claims.4 5 The Court also declared that in the past FDA had acknowledged
456 Id. at 1198.
41 Id. at 1199.
41 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.
45 Id.
46 Id.
461 Id. (quoting from Proposed Rules, HHS, FDA, 21 CFR Part 201, Requirements on Content
and format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription
Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81, 082, 81,103 (Dec. 22, 2000)).
462 Id.
46 Id.
4f Id.
46 Id. at 1201-1202. See, eg, Prescription Drug Product Labeling: Medication guide Requirements,
63 Fed. Reg. 66,378, 66,384 (Dec. 1, 1998) (declaring that "FDA does not believe that the evolution of
state tort law will cause the development of standards that would be at odds with the agency's regula-
tions"); Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients; Preemption of Disclosure
Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 3944, 3948 (Jan. 27, 1994) (observing that "FDA recognizes the sophistication and
complexity of private tort litigation in the United States and the proposed preemption action is not
intended to frustrate or impede tort litigation in this area"); Labeling and Prescription Drug Adver-
tising; Content and format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,437
(June 26, 1979) (stating that "[ilt is not the intent of the FDA to influence the civil tort liability of the
manufacturer ...); but see Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (describing the position taken in
the Preamble as reflecting "the government's long standing views on preemption").
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the limited nature of its resources and had treated common law tort suits as a
complementary form of drug regulation.466 In the Court's view, FDA's "dramatic
change in position" provided no persuasive explanation for why tort litigation had
suddenly changed from being a useful supplement to FDA regulation to an obstacle
to that agency's regulatory mission.
467
Furthermore, the Court also refused to give any deference to the United States'
amicus brief, which supported FDA's contention that failure to warn claims should
be preemption on obstacle preemption grounds.468 In contrast to the Government's
amicus brief in Geier, for example, which explained in detail the potential adverse
effects of "no airbag" claims on DOT's policy of gradual introduction of airbags, the
Wyeth Court maintained that the Government's brief failed to adequately explain
the reason for the FDA's sudden shift in its policy on preemption.
4 9
Finally, the Court observed that "FDA has traditionally regarded state law as a
complimentary form of drug regulation.14 0 The Court pointed out that FDA had
limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs currently on the market.4 7 ' On the
other hand, tort suits led to the discovery of previously unknown drug hazards and
provided an economic incentive for drug manufacturers to disclose risks promptly
to health professionals and the public.472 Consequently, the Court concluded that
failure to warn claims like the plaintiff's did not obstruct federal regulation of drug
labeling. 473 It should be emphasized that the Court's view of the relationship of
federal regulation and state tort law was not limited to the specifics of the Wyeth
case, but was fully applicable to other FDA preemption cases as well. 7
To conclude, it remains to be seen whether legal scholars will consider Wyeth
to be a landmark preemption case. However, by providing a template for deciding
whether failure to warn claims against the manufacturers of prescription drugs are
preempted on actual conflict grounds, the Wyeth case has already had a significant
influence on several failure to warn cases and is likely to provide guidance to other
courts in the future. For that reason, it is an important contribution to the Supreme
Court's preemption jurisprudence.
06 Id. at 1202.
16 Id. at 1203.
11 The United States had filed amicus briefs on behalf of FDA in a number of cases, including
Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006), 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008).
46 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203 n. 13.
41 Id. at 1202.
47 Id.
472 Id.
41 Id. at 1204.
47 See, eg, Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 448-49, *14 (5th Cir. 2010); Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc.,
601 E Supp. 2d 1262, 1265 (WD. Okla. 2009).
